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ABSTRACT
Can an exchange be “dark,” so that orders are not displayed, while
simultaneously trustworthy, so that the execution of trades and flow
of information occur as promised? SEC actions against dark pools
suggest cause for concern, and regulators seem to be moving to-
wards requiring more disclosure. Yet there is a clear tension: trad-
ing order information is widely exploited. Therefore, institutional
investors have a strong interest in keeping pre-trade information
about large trades hidden. Secrecy-preserving proofs of correct-
ness can be used to build trust without revealing unnecessary infor-
mation. By performing operations on obfuscated representations
of orders (perhaps encrypted or otherwise hidden), a zero knowl-
edge proof can be provided, allowing anyone to verify correctness
of trades. Crucially, this can be done without revealing any infor-
mation beyond this correctness. This technology can be usefully
applied to construct provably trustworthy dark pools. Additional
practical protocols relax the definition of “zero knowledge" to re-
veal limited information, providing necessary transparency for ef-
ficient market operation while limiting information that can be ex-
ploited by observers. Coupled with Trusted Computing hardware,
these protocols can provide an excellent balance of practicality with
secrecy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software engineering]: Software/Program Verification—
Correctness proofs, validation; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Privacy, Regulation; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Eco-
nomics
General Terms
Algorithms, Economics, Legal Aspects, Verification
Keywords
Dark pool, Zero-Knowledge Proofs, Trust, Market design
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have brought a rising concern in regard to the trust-
worthiness of public stock exchanges, grabbing the public’s atten-
tion through Flash boys [17]. As described there, limit orders are
“front-run” by high frequency trading (HFT) algorithms, with a buy
order that is placed by an institutional investor such as Fidelity
on one exchange detected and HFTs “running ahead” or “front-
running,” and buying shares on other exchanges in anticipation of
driving up the price and quickly selling back to this investor.
As stated in a 2015 memo written by the SEC Division of Trad-
ing and Markets [30]:
Institutional investors typically need to trade in large
size. If the market can infer their trading intentions
from their trading activities before the full size of their
trading interest is executed, the likely result will be
an unfavorable price move against the institutional in-
vestor (“price impact"). To minimize this price impact,
institutional investors often seek to execute their orders
by splitting them into many, smaller-sized “child" or-
ders that are fed into the market over time.
Indeed, national securities exchanges such as Nasdaq and BATS
introduced special types of orders to provide HFTs with informa-
tion on orders without any requirement to trade in return for this
information.1 A 2015 action of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) [31] against the Direct Edge exchange (now
part of BATS) states that trading clients had influence on the design
of orders, and received special information about the way certain
kinds of order types would work. According to Lewis [17], the lo-
cation of BATS just outside the Lincoln tunnel from Manhattan also
provides special value to HFTs, allowing them to gain information
about new orders just ahead of other exchanges.
In short, HFTs have developed algorithms that detect large trades
by monitoring market orders, and when they detect a likely large
trade, they make exploiting trades ahead of the large trade.
1These are the flash and post-only order types associated with the
so-called flash order controversy [38].
One response to concerns about the fairness of public securities
exchanges and the trading behaviors of HFTs has been a further
fragmentation of stock markets and the proliferation of dark pools.
A dark pool is an alternative trading system (ATS), and regulated
under a different set of rules than public exchanges (see the Ap-
pendix). The name dark pool refers to a trading system that gen-
erally does not display orders. Whether trading occurs on a pub-
lic exchange or a dark pool, regulation requires that all trades are
priced at or better than the best quoted bid and ask prices displayed
on the national securities exchanges, referred to as the National
Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). Dark pools typically price trades to
be at the midpoint of the NBBO. For example, if the NBBO price
spread is 20-20.02 (bid-ask) then the trade is executed at 20.01.2 In
this sense, dark pools provide volume discovery rather than price
discovery, with the price being set in public exchanges.
Beyond hiding pre-trade order information, some dark pools try
to limit who participates in the pool to passive, institutional in-
vestors who trade on stock price movements and not information,
and who wouldn’t be expected to trade based on order flow.3 As
much as a third of the volume executed in Nasdaq and NYSE stocks
is now traded in dark pools and other off-exchange trading.4
As evidenced by actions brought by the SEC and others in recent
years, this emergence of private exchanges is bringing with it new
concerns about trust. See Table 1, and refer to the Appendix for
some specific details. Some general concerns include:
• Orders not matched with “natural liquidity” on the other side
of the dark pool as claimed (Pipeline)
• Order information shared improperly with other traders (Liq-
uidnet, LavaFlow)
• Price set incorrectly (SIGMA X)
• HFTs able to gain useful information through trading or ex-
ploit order types (Barclays LX, UBS)
A group of fund managers (i.e., passive, institutional investors)
plan to launch a new dark pool named Luminex later in 2015 [9],
proposing to restrict participation, insist on a commitment to a min-
imum block size for trades and price at the midpoint of NBBO. We
return to the design of the Luminex dark pool in Section 3.
Concerns about HFTs, and an interest in enabling better execu-
tion of large block trades for institutional investors, have also pro-
moted renewed interest in batch auctions (that match orders syn-
chronously, at a defined time). The London Stock Exchange and
the NYSE plan to introduce a mid-day batch auction [14, 39]. Ex-
isting dark pools such as POSIT Match and Instinet execute orders
in batch, for example once per day or at multiple intervals during
the trading day [29]. In light of HFTs, Budish et al. [4, 5] analyze
frequent batch auctions for use in place of a continuous limit order
2Prominent dark pools such as Liquidnet, Barclays DirectEx, BIDS
and IEX report more than seventy percent of their trades are done
at the NBBO midpoint [40].
3Rather than restrict participants, another market design response
is to delay all data flowing from a dark pool just enough to pre-
vent HFTs from front-running orders. The IEX trading system in-
terposes a 350 millisecond delay on all data through the use of a
38-mile coil of optical fiber. This allows its own computers to look
for better prices on other exchanges before the HFTs respond.
4The volume executed in Nasdaq stocks increased from 29.4% to
2005 and 38.6% in 2014; the change in volume of NYSE stocks
was from 13.0% in 2005 to 34.6% in 2014 [30]. This includes
ATS volume as well as internalization, which occurs when banks
and brokers match orders from clients against their own customers’
trading flow.
books in a public exchange. In such a design, all orders received
during the same interval are treated as having arrived at the same
time. A uniform price double auction is used to clear the market, at
which point all orders are displayed.5
To summarize:
1. There are concerns about the predatory practices of HFTs
in public securities exchanges, and especially with behavior
such as front-running, that causes orders placed in one ex-
change to have a short-term price impact in other exchanges.
2. Dark pools were originally envisioned as a way to allow insti-
tutional investors to handle large block trades, trading amongst
themselves at the broader market price and without interact-
ing with fast, algorithmic trading algorithms looking to make
short-term profits.
3. The opaqueness of dark pools leads to new concerns about
trust, in regard to whether they will correctly match and price
orders, whether or not active investors can still participate
and gain an unfair advantage, and whether or not useful in-
formation might still flow to HFTs either as a side-effect of
placing orders or through other information flows.
The need for institutional investors to have provably correct ex-
ecution (and thus “best” execution, with best defined as is appro-
priate to the rules of the exchange as well as governing SEC reg-
ulation) has become stronger than ever. This is especially true for
dark pools, since these have been short on transparency. This is be-
coming a challenge for market operators, such as banks and dealer-
brokers, who are running these trading systems. In recent years,
this requirement is extending from exchange traded products such
as stocks to other products such as foreign exchanges, and thus
there is likely to be an increasing interest in the techniques de-
scribed in this paper.
1.1 Illustrative Challenges
Consider the following concrete examples of challenges faced
by the operator of a dark pool in convincing participants about the
trustworthiness of a market:
(I) in the context of the IEX dark pool (a continuous limit order
book), prove that published “priority rules” in regard to time, price
and quantity are being followed when matching bids and asks.
(II) in the context of a dark pool such as Barclays LX, which
uses an algorithm to assign a level of “aggressiveness” to a trader in
the pool, prove that the levels are correctly assigned, and that rules
by which a participant can restrict the counter-party with which it
trades are correctly applied.
(III) in the context of a frequent batch auction by BCS Inc.,
prove that orders are being correctly sealed until the end of a dis-
crete time interval, that the set of orders is not modified at that time,
and that the uniform price rule is correctly applied.
(IV) in the context of a dark pool such as that proposed by Lu-
minex, prove that statements of interest and orders cannot be shared
with other parties.
5A theoretical model shows that a frequent batch auction reduces
the value that HFTs can gain from speed, and suggests that this
would lower the costs for passive investors [5]. Wah et al. [45,
44] adopt a computational approach to study the effect of adopting
batch auctions. Their analysis suggests that batch auctions would
attract sufficient volume in competition with continuous limit order
books, with HFTs following passive traders to participate in batch
auctions.
Dark pool / ATS Date of action Complaint Penalty Size of pool
Pipeline October, 2011 Majority of trades executed by subsidiary of Pipeline $1 million Closed
Liquidnet June, 2014 Pre-trade indications of interest shared with trading desk $2 million 14th largest
Goldman SIGMA X June, 2014 Price outside of NBBO $800,000 6th largest
Barclays LX June, 2014 Inconsistent profiling of “aggressiveness” of traders, Contested 9th largest
and application of this profile; catering to HFTs
Citigroup LavaFlow July, 2014 Share information on hidden orders with affiliated business unit $5 million Closed
UBS dark pool January, 2015 Sub-penny pricing via order types offered to HFTs, $14.4 million Largest
selective access to a system to protect against HFT counter-party
Table 1: Actions of regulatory authorities against dark pools and alternative trading systems. The rank of a dark pool by trading
volume is for May 2015, and based on average daily volume statistics [40].
Now imagine providing these proofs of correctness in a way that
does not reveal any information about orders past or present. This
is the task to which secrecy-preserving proofs of correctness can be
applied.
1.2 Outline
Rather than provide a technical treatment, the goal is to provide
a brief survey of prior research into the use of secrecy-preserving
proofs of correctness for building trustworthy markets. The discus-
sion will emphasize practical aspects, and note some of the remain-
ing difficulties. These are not around providing secrecy-preserving
proofs of correctness, but around preventing an unscrupulous mar-
ket operator from choosing to disclose additional information.
In Section 3, we connect the discussion back to the design of
dark pools and trading systems, revisiting the proposed Luminex
dark pool design and sketching out two complementary designs.
We also circle back to the four challenges above, and suggest some
additional benefits of cryptographic methods in regard to required
disclosures to regulators.
The Appendix provides some details on the actions of the SEC
and others against dark pools and ATSs in recent years, along with
a brief summary of regulation of financial markets as it relates to
the design of exchanges and trading systems.
2. SECRECY-PRESERVING PROOFS
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of trust that we might like
to establish through cryptographic methods:
Secrecy-preserving correctness: a market operator can prove to
anyone that the market outputs (i.e., trades) are correct given the
rules of the market and the inputs (i.e., orders), and do so without
revealing any information about the inputs other than that implied
by the outputs or as otherwise required (e.g. regulation, exchange
rules, or market design).
Strong Secrecy: the market operator is unable to release any ad-
ditional information about the inputs (i.e., orders) other than that
implied by the outputs (i.e., trades) and other information disclo-
sure required by regulators.
The first property is useful even without the second property,
because it allows a market operator to establish correctness without
revealing information about orders. The second property provides
additional confidence that the operator of a market, who is known
to be correctly executing trades based on orders, is not at the same
time sharing information that could lead to price impact in other
exchanges or provide an advantage to investors placing orders in
this market.
Section 2.1 provides a brief overview of some required back-
ground in regard to cryptographic methods. Sections 2.2 and 2.3
focus on methods to establish secrecy-preserving correctness. Sec-
tion 2.4 refers to methods to establish secrecy.
2.1 Preliminaries
Some of the constituent components for providing secrecy- pre-
serving proofs of correctness are:
• An electronic bulletin board to which any trader or the mar-
ket operator can post data. Posted data is time stamped and
data cannot be erased.
• A public key infrastructure (PKI), providing a sound method
of establishing and sharing public keys that can be used,
amongst other things to generate the encryption E(x) of a
value x. This is the “ciphertext”, while x is the “plaintext” x.
Encryption requires that the value x can only be recovered
from E(x) by someone who has the corresponding private
key.
• A commitment method, that is required to be information hid-
ing and binding. If a commitment COM (x) is made to value
x, then this does not reveal any information about x, and it
is binding, such that when a private key corresponding to the
commitment is released the commitment releases value x and
no other value.6
• A time-lapse cryptography service that provides a constant
stream of public keys and commits to reconstruct and pub-
lish the associated secret decryption keys at pre-defined in-
tervals [27, 28].
• A homomorphic encryption scheme, allowing computation
to be performed on encrypted values such that the result is
the encryption of an associated computation on the values
themselves; e.g., computingE(x1)·E(x2)might correspond
toE(x1+x2). This allows anyone with access toE(x1) and
E(x2) to verify output y = x1 + x2 by computing E(y),
and checking E(x1) · E(x2) = E(y). This does not reveal
anything about x1 and x2 beyond “x1 + x2 = y.”
The existence of a PKI is used for many of these components,
including homomorphic encryption schemes [22] and time-lapse
cryptography. A PKI also allows digital signatures; i.e., the ability
to sign an input with a participant’s private key so that anyone can
validate the source of the input.
6Encryption schemes also satisfy hiding, and are typically bind-
ing. The crucial difference between commitment and encryption
is that encryption requires that decryption can be achieved with
some private key that applies independent of what is encrypted,
while a commitment can be opened with a message-dependent key.
This makes the design of commitment schemes easier than that of
public-key encryption; see Dodis [8] for more information.
2.2 The Evaluator-Prover Model
The evaluator-prover (EP) model [23, 26] provides a useful
framework for practical, secrecy-preserving proofs. Multiple play-
ers secretly submit input values x1, . . . , xn to the EP. The EP com-
putes a function y = f(x1, . . . , xn), outputs the value y, and en-
gages in a proof of the correctness of the result. The proof of cor-
rectness can be verified by anyone, and is sound (so that it is not
possible to prove a false claim, except with very low probability.)
An EP is secrecy-preserving if the proof does not reveal anything
about the input except for the information implied by the output
value.
Note that the EP model allows the EP to learn the input values.
Because of this, the EP model provides secrecy-preserving correct-
ness but without strong secrecy. The EP must operate the rules of
the market correctly, given the inputs (i.e., determine the correct
trades given the orders.)7 But the EP could still choose to disclose
information about orders, including pre-trade information.
To fix ideas, let’s think about the EP model in the context of a
batch auction that will clear at some time T . The trades determined
at time T must correspond to the correct trades given the rules, and
given the orders placed by time T . In addition, time-lapse cryp-
tography can be used to prevent the EP knowing anything about
the orders before time T . However, the EP is not prevented from
sharing information about the orders after time period T .
Applications.
A number of applications of the EP model have been suggested,
to a variety of auction designs and security market designs. See
Table 2. These include multi-unit auctions, combinatorial auctions,
clock auctions, batch auctions and a market with a continuous limit
order books.
A typical operation of a trustworthy, sealed-bid auction runs as
follows [23]:
1. Each bidder encrypts his or her bid with the auctioneer’s pub-
lic key and posts it to the bulletin board, as a commitment via
time-lapse cryptography.
2. The time-lapse cryptography service opens the commitments
to reveal the encrypted bids, and everyone can verify that the
encrypted bids correspond to the commitments.
3. The auctioneer (privately) decrypts the bids using its private
key, determines and posts the outcome of the auction (the
winner, the payment) along with a proof of the correctness
of the outcome to the bulletin board.
4. Anyone can verify the proof that the outcome is correct given
the encrypted bids on the bulletin board.
Let’s now turn to two applications that have been developed for
securities markets.
Combinatorial batch auction [42]. Each trader submits an or-
der that states an interest to trade a basket of trades. The submitted
baskets are “crossed,” with pricing at the midpoint of the NBBO.
Any orders that aren’t completely filled are combined to form a
remainder basket. Anyone can verify that this remainder is deter-
mined correctly given the submitted orders. The right to trade this
7A little more precisely, the market operator could deviate from
the rules, but the market operator would with high likelihood be
caught. Thus, as long as the penalties for incorrect operations are
high enough, it is reasonable to believe that the market operator
will follow the rules correctly.
remainder basket in the broader market is auctioned off, with bid-
ders in this auction able to request risk characteristics, for example
the “skew” (difference between long and short trades), along with
market sector and market cap information. The cost of trading the
remainder basket would be shared amongst participants in the batch
auction according to orders placed in the pool. By using on auction
on the remainder, this design ensures that the information available
to the EP after the auction is complete is of minimal value.8
Continuous limit order book [41]. This design maintains an
encrypted order book and proves that all updates made to the book
are correct given encrypted orders that arrive into the market. On
this basis, a proof of correctness can be provided whenever a trade
occurs. The designer can also choose which statistics to publish
about the state of the order book, ranging from no statistics to infor-
mation such as market depth, bid-ask spread, etc. The correctness
of all such statistics can be proved to participants without revealing
any more about the order book. The authors also point to the use of
special purpose hardware, or methods to distribute inputs amongst
a group of parties, as a way to achieve strong secrecy. This is a
topic that we return to in Section 2.4.
2.3 Cryptographic approaches
Many papers have been written on zero-knowledge proofs since
the seminal contributions of Goldwasser et al. [12] and Goldreich et
al. [11]. The focus is on approaches that are designed to be practi-
cal in real-world settings, and especially on techniques that fit well
with the EP model.
Table 3 provides a summary of progress in regard to the time re-
quired to verify the outcome of a sealed-bid, single item auction in
the EP model. We also mention two approaches to attaining strong
secrecy as well as correctness. Rather than verification, the output
of these approaches is correct by design. Specifically— the com-
putation is distributed to multiple parties, and as long as enough
parties can be trusted not to collude then the output will be correct
and no additional information can be learned by anyone about the
inputs.
A decisive advantage of the EP model in financial markets is
speed: the computation itself can be done on plaintext, and is thus
unencumbered by the need to be necessarily correct (as in the case
of the distributed approaches) or to prove correctness.9 A proof of
correctness can be generated after-the-fact, and even on demand.
By way of contrast, the approaches of secure function evaluation
and multi-party computation are likely to introduce too much la-
tency because a complex, multi-round message passing protocol is
required to perform computation on obfuscated inputs. For this rea-
son, we restrict the following discussion to approaches that have
been proposed in achieving secrecy-preserving proofs in the EP
model.
Paillier encryption.
One approach uses the Paillier homomorphic encryption
scheme [22].Given encryptions E(x1) and E(x2) of two values,
x1 and x2, and a public constant a, anyone can compute the en-
cryptions E(x1 + x2), E(x1 + a) and E(x1 · a) without learning
8Similarly, when applied to a procurement auction or for the sale
of wireless spectrum licenses, the first order concern is to complete
the auction in a way that is correct and trustworthy. Any loss in
secrecy after the auction closes cannot affect the outcome of the
auction, and is reasonably considered a secondary concern.
9This point is also made by Thorpe and Willis, who point out that
realtime decision making can be separated from asynchronous cor-
rectnes proofs [43].
Auction design Application Reference
Multi-unit auctions with second-price payments Procurement PRST [23]
Clock-proxy auction, including package bids, core payments, price feedback Wireless spectrum PRT [24]
Combinatorial batch auction, including auction to sell remainder basket Securities TP [42]
Continuous limit order book, configurable to reveal different statistics about order book Securities TP [41]
Multiple second-price auctions Internet advertising RMMY [25]
Table 2: Applications of the Evaluator-Prover model to secrecy-preserving proofs.
Crypto-scheme Properties Notes / Verification time Reference
Secure two-party computation Correctness, Strong secrecy 2 parties, garbled circuits† NPS [19]
Secret sharing, secure multi-party computation Correctness, Strong secrecy ˜4 trusted parties‡ HTK [13], BDJ+ [1]
Paillier encryption [22] Correctness (EP model) ˜1 minute per bid PRST [23]
Random representation (RR) Correctness (EP model) ˜500 milliseconds per bid RST [26]
RR, with hardware commitment device Correctness (EP model) ˜0.02 milliseconds per bid RMMY [25]
Table 3: Time to verify a proof (generally scales linearly in number of bids). Some of this timing information is 5+ years old and
runtimes may be significantly shorter now as a result of advances in computing hardware. †Garbled circuit may be impractical [18].
‡Multi-party schemes may be impractical [19].
anything about x1 or x2.10
To convey the approach, and some details (about “help values”
to provide semantic security11): suppose that E(x1) and E(x2) are
posted to the bulletin board, and that the computation of interest
is x1 + x2. The EP decrypts the inputs, and computes and posts
output y = x1 + x2 to the bulletin board. Given this, anyone can
use d = E(x1 + x2) = E(x1) · E(x2) to compute the encrypted
value of the sum, and then confirm that d = E(y).
The majority of the computational cost associated with Paillier
encryption comes from modular exponentiations; see Thorpe and
Parkes [42] for estimates of the time required to prove correctness
for a combinatorial batch auction on 3,000 securities as well as
some remarks about how to further speed up the approach.
Random representation.
Developed by Rabin et al. [26, 25], and extending methods of
Kilian [15] and Brassard et al. [3], the approach of random repre-
sentation provides an approach that in comparison to homomorphic
encryption is both faster and simpler to understand (which can help
in gaining acceptance).12 The approach provides a proof of correct-
ness that is sound with high probability; i.e., a false claim will only
be accepted with a negligible probability. All computation is per-
formed on values in a field Fp for prime p, for example p = 2128,
and all arithmetic is done mod p. As is standard in the EP model,
the computation is done by the evaluator on plaintext using any
algorithmic approach.
The approach to providing a secrecy-preserving proof of correct-
ness is to represent a value x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} as a pair of num-
bers X1 = (u1, v1), such that u1 ∈ Fp is randomly chosen and
10For proofs of multiplication, and for inequality comparisons and
interval membership proofs, the EP can use an interactive proof
(i.e., a proof that involves the verifier issuing a random challenge
to the EP). See Parkes et al. [23] for details.
11Given two plaintexts and their encryptions, semantic security re-
quires that one cannot tell which ciphertext corresponds to which
plaintext without being able to decrypt them.
12For example, the hiding property of the Paillier encryption scheme
is based on a computational assumption named the “decisional
composite residuosity assumption” [23]. In comparison, the prop-
erties of the random representation scheme follow from simple
information-theoretic arguments.
(u1 + v1) mod p = x1. Let val(X1) = (u1 + v1) mod p. All
inputs are encoded this way (in what are sometimes referred to as
“blobs”). Given this, properties can be proved about relationships
between inputs and outputs for each coordinate separately, and se-
crecy is preserved by never revealing both coordinates.
For a concrete example, let X1 = (u1, v1) and X2 = (u2, v2)
represent two input values (with plaintext values x1 and x2). As-
sume that a commitment to all four values is posted to the bul-
letin board, and that the computation of interest is x1 + x2. The
EP opens the commitments, and computes and posts the output
y = val(X1)+val(X2) to the bulletin board. The output is correct
if, and only if, there exists a value w such that:
u1 + u2 = y + w, and (1)
v1 + v2 = −w. (2)
The EP also posts value w to the bulletin board, and will now
engage in an interactive proof to convince a verifier that y is correct.
The verifier issues a random challenge c ← {1, 2}. Let’s assume
c = 1. The EP now reveals u1 and u2. If these values are consistent
with the commitments, and (1) holds, then the verifier accepts the
proof. Analogously, if the challenge is c = 2, then the EP reveals
v1 and v2 and the verifier accepts the proof if these are consistent
with the commitments and property (2) holds.
We make the following observations:
(i) the proof reveals nothing about val(X1) and val(X2) beyond
what would be implied by correctness; and
(ii) if the claim is correct, then the verifier will always accept
the proof, and if the claim is false, then the verifier will accept the
proof with probability at most 1/2.
For (i), suppose without loss of generality that c = 1. Values
u1, u2 and w are revealed. But nothing is revealed about v1, and
for any v1 there exists some v2 such that v1 + v2 = −w. There-
fore, knowledge of u1 reveals nothing about val(X1). A similar
argument for v2 shows that nothing is revealed about val(X2).
For (ii), the interesting case is when the claim is not true. But
then at least one of (1) and (2) must be false, and so a random
challenge will discover the problem with probability at least 1/2.
In order to “amplify” this soundness, and ensure that a false
claim will be caught with high probability, the EP can perform k,
independent proofs. Simple analysis shows that the probability that
the EP will not be caught when making a false claim is less than
1/2k.13
The random-representation approach extends to verify proper-
ties between input and output values that can be computed through
a straight line computation. This is a computation on inputs
x1, . . . , xn that corresponds to a sequence
SLC = x1, . . . , xn, xn+1, . . . , xL, (3)
where for all t > n there exist j, k < t for which properties such
as xt = xj + xk or xt = xj · xk or xt = xj hold, and where xL is
the output. By creating a random representation of all intermediate
values, the challenge-and-respond proof structure extends to prove
the correctness of a straight line computation. The approach also
extends to prove inequality and interval membership properties be-
tween values (see Rabin et al. [25]).
It is worth emphasizing that the algorithmic approach to com-
pute the output f(x1, . . . , xn) from the inputs is not restricted to
straight-line computation. Rather, this can be done via any algo-
rithmic approach. It is just the proof of correctness that must be
performed through properties that can be straight-line computed
(i.e., without branching). For example, the winner of an auction
can be determined by finding the maximum of a set of bids. Sup-
pose that bidder 1 is the winner. The proof would then establish
x1 > xj for all j 6= 1. The proof structures enabled by straight-
line computation seem quite flexible can be applied to settings such
as multi-unit and combinatorial auctions.
2.4 Strong Secrecy
Given the short-term price impact that can arise from informa-
tion about orders, and because of parasitic practices such as front-
running, providing a guarantee of strong secrecy may be important
for trading systems.
How important this is in practice will depend on the specifics of
the market design. For example, it will depend on the extent to
which information that is available to an EP could be used in a way
that is detrimental to investors who participate in the trading sys-
tem. A design that includes an enforced delay in information flow,
as in the IEX market, is already more robust against front-running
by HFTs. A design that fills every order, and does so in a batch auc-
tion (as in Thorpe and Parkes [42]) for which pre-trade information
is kept secret, leaves little actionable a posteriori information.
The importance of strong secrecy also depends on what infor-
mation can already be discovered through trading. For example, a
dark pool that admits HFTs and allows HFTs to trade with passive
investors may already leak considerable information about large or-
ders. If a pool is already leaky in this sense then strong secrecy
doesn’t add much of value!
We describe two approaches to addressing this challenge of
strong secrecy. The first uses secure computing hardware and the
second uses secure multi-party computation.
Trusted Computing.
One approach to achieving strong secrecy is to retain the EP
model but adopt specialized hardware to prevent undesired infor-
mation disclosure.
A Trusted Computing infrastructure, based on secure hardware
13In particular, multiple random representations of the inputs are
generated (and verified to be equal to each other), and then the
verifier issues k independent challenges. Because the verifier will
only accept the proof if every challenge succeeds, the probability
bound follows [26]. A recent extension allows the prover to supply
any required number of proofs to multiple verifiers, by creating
more copies of the input on the fly as required [25].
and digitally signed software, and installed in a physically secure
location with ongoing automated monitoring, can prevent the leak-
ing of information [37]. Trusted Computing makes use of a secure
processor, which is a closed device for which all outputs are pub-
licly observable. A useful mental model is that of a “computer in a
cage” with all outputs monitored.
Because the communication interfaces are monitored, communi-
cation can be restricted to information in allowed categories, such
as (i) trades, (ii) proofs of correctness, or (iii) other information re-
quired by regulators or for compliance.14 Secrecy-preserving cor-
rectness proofs complement this approach— we need not trust the
computer to produce correct results, the proofs play this role.
Research into the use of Trusted Computing infrastructure to
build markets that are both provably correct and provide strong se-
crecy is still in its infancy. For example, one concern is that in-
formation could still leak out even if the only data that is posted
falls into an approved category. For example, there could be a
“steganographic attack,” where information is smuggled through
covert channels (perhaps embedded in the use of spaces or fonts).
This smuggling could also happen through appropriate choices of
random values when constructing proofs, these values revealed dur-
ing the verification process.15
Multi-party function evaluation.
A second approach to strong secrecy is to adopt methods
from secure multi-party computation; see Harkavy et al. [13] and
Bogetoft et al. [1]. At a high-level, these approaches tend to assume
the existence of multiple, non-colluding computers that work col-
lectively to operate the trading system. These computers comprise
a distributed computational model for the trading system. It is im-
portant that these entities are each operated by a different business,
because secrecy is only achieved when they can be trusted to work
independently and not collude. Each trader distributes parts of his
or her input (i.e., order) to each computer. As long as enough com-
puters follow the protocol, it is not possible for any entity to learn
the orders, and no information can be disclosed.
As discussed earlier, these kinds of secure multi-party computa-
tion approaches are likely impractical for financial exchanges be-
cause of the latency involved in computation. Computation in-
volves a large number of rounds of message passing between the
distributed machines, introducing latency (something hard to tol-
erate in the context of financial markets). Moreover, an outside
observer must trust that the rules of the protocol are being correctly
followed, and cannot independently verify this. Finally, the com-
putational model of multiple, independent entities operating the
distributed trading system does not typically fit well with business
models; a possible exception is the Luminex dark pool, which will
be co-sponsored by a number of market participants to which its
operation could be distributed.16
14This third kind of data can be encrypted (e.g., with the public key
of a regulator), and itself be subject to a proof of correctness, in
order to verify that it is correctly computed on the basis of orders
placed and trades executed.
15In regard to this concern, Rabin et al. [26] propose to use an in-
dependent secure co-processor RANDOM with a physical random
number generator that acts as a universal source of randomness.
16Di Crescenzo [7] describes an approach where each trader par-
ticipates in a secure, two-party computation with a single market
operator. However the market operator is assumed to be “honest
but curious,” meaning that it would like to learn the inputs but will
run any program honestly. This does not seem very realistic.
3. CONNECTING TO DARK POOLS
In this section, we provide a high-level description of three styl-
ized dark pool designs, any of which would benefit from secrecy-
preserving proofs of correctness in building trust.
3.1 Continuous, Block trades only
The design of the proposed Luminex dark pool could be instan-
tiated within the EP model (see challenge I, above):
1. A trader can submit an order at any time to buy or sell a
stock, along with an “auto-execute amount” and a maxi-
mum quantity. These orders are posted to a bulletin board
in a “sealed” form (eg., using homomorphic encryption or
random-representations.)
2. The EP privately receives the inputs.
3. Any time there is a match (a buy and sell order on the same
stock), the EP will execute a trade. First, if the orders suggest
that a larger trade is possible, each counter-party is given a
specified delay (e.g., 20 seconds) to privately report a quan-
tity between its auto-execute amount and its max. These
quantities are sealed and posted to a bulletin board. Time-
lapse cryptography can keep information sealed during the
time interval.
4. The EP executes the trade at the midpoint of the NBBO (or
the volume-weighted average NBBO price if a delay was in-
curred), and at the maximum possible quantity given the re-
ports.
5. The EP publishes a proof of correctness (i.e., that the two
orders should match according to the priority rule, that the
quantity traded is correct, etc.).
Some details would need to be worked out in regard to how to
handle priority rules. But supposing a quantity-time rule then this
would require that an order selected to match is either strictly larger
than all other orders, or that there is no larger order and that this or-
der arrived no later than any other orders of the same size. Proving
these kinds if inequality relationships on inputs is familiar from
proving the correctness of the outcome of an auction (e.g., for a
second-price auction with bids x1, . . . , xn, that x1 > xj (j 6= 1)
and x2 ≥ xj (j 6= 1)).
The proposed design of the Luminex dark pool includes a mini-
mum block size for any trade, and traders must commit to trade at
least this quantity in the event of a match. This is to make it more
difficult for information to leak to HFTs through trading. Plac-
ing orders to gain information about the order book becomes more
costly— an algorithm would need to buy (or sell) a large number
of stocks in order to learn about another order.
3.2 Continuous, with Counter-party aware-
ness
A lingering question is whether there will ever be enough contra-
side interest amongst a dark pool that is restricted to only include
institutional investors, many of whom are tracking the same stock
indexes. According to Levine [16] the “dream of many institutional
investors, and ... the story that every dark pool wants to tell” is:
“You can trade stocks without interacting with profes-
sional traders who expect to make money in the short
term by interacting with institutional order flow. You
can have a market that is just institutions trading with
institutions, with no short-term profit-seekers hanging
around taking their share.
Levine continues:
“But there’s a problem, which is that it doesn’t work
very well. When you just put institutional investors in a
pool that excludes high-frequency traders, they have a
hard time trading with each other. There’s not, it turns
out, all that much natural liquidity.”
This helps to rationalize the design of the Barclays LX dark
pool, and suggests a second, stylized design. Like the LX pool,
this design allows both active and passive investors, but tries to
provide some transparency as to trading styles. In particular, the
LX pool is designed to allow an investor to know something about
how “aggressive” a counter-party is, and choose who they want to
match against (and thus which kinds of traders may gain informa-
tion about their order).
Responding to challenge II, we also note that the design of the
LX pool fits well with the EP model: secrecy-preserving proofs of
correctness can be used to prove that a publicly available computa-
tion is used correctly to assign an “aggressiveness” label to a trader,
and that rules are used correctly for matching, all the while without
revealing information about the label itself or the history of orders
or trades of an individual.
3.3 Frequent Batch, Passive and Active
It’s worth taking a step back, and asking what trust is enabled
by using secrecy-preserving proofs of correctness, without strong
secrecy, in a market that uses a continuous limit order book. True,
the market operator can only follow the published rules in deciding
on trades to execute. Proofs of correctness allow this kind of trust to
be established. But nothing prevents a market operator at any time
once an order has been placed, and before the order has traded,
from leaking information about this order. The distinction between
“before” and “after,” present in a sealed-bid auction, is completely
blurred in an asynchronous, continuous trading environment. It is
good that a market operator does not need to reveal information
to establish proofs of correctness. But without strong secrecy, a
market operator cannot commit not to leak pre-trade information.
A third, stylized design is use a frequent batch auction. In con-
trast to the design of Budish et al. [5], the design would complete
all trades at the mid-point of the NBBO. The design would insist on
pegged orders from institutional investors (to trade at the midpoint
of NBBO), coupled with auto-execute quantities (as in the Luminex
design). The design could choose to allow limit orders and smaller
quantities from active investors, seeking to promote additional liq-
uidity.17 Rather than disclose orders at the end of the time interval,
a secrecy-preserving proof of correctness can be provided at the
completion of every batch (challenge III).
In addition to the benefits outlined by Budish et al. [5], includ-
ing lower cost of providing liquidity and mitigating the advantage
gained by fast traders over slow traders, the use of batch auctions
over continuous limit books provides more for cryptographic meth-
ods to do. By providing a clear “before” and “after” distinction, the
auction takes on the flavor of a sealed-bid auction and bids placed
during the time interval between batches can be kept secret from all
participants, including the market operator, using time-lapse cryp-
tography. By also including an enforced delay of information flow
(IEX style), the routing algorithms used by the pool in meeting the
“order protection” regulation (see the Appendix) can reach other
exchanges before information about orders can be used by HFTs.
17The intent here is not to be overly prescriptive, but to suggest a
combination of features that could be useful in enabling a well-
functioning dark pool.
3.4 Discussion
In regard to strong secrecy (challenge IV), and proving that state-
ments of interest or orders cannot be shared with other parties,
the most promising direction is to adopt Trusted Computing. This
would replace the EP with a Secure Processor Evaluator-Prover
(SPEP) [26], and a computer that is not only able to prove the cor-
rectness of its outputs given its inputs but also able to commit to
only reveal allowable information (such as a record of executed
trades, proofs of correctness.) Given the importance of fair and
well-functioning financial markets and the resources that can be
brought to bear in this industry sector this topic is worthy of ongo-
ing research and development.
Another use of cryptographic technology is for provably correct
disclosure in meeting regulatory requirements. For example, a dark
pool can publish and prove the correctness of aggregate volume
statistics without disclosing any information about order flow. This
can be useful in promoting stronger regulation without compromis-
ing proprietary information corresponding to strategies [9]. Regu-
lators may also be interested in a proof that traders are not using
the prohibited practice of “spoofing” [36]. Navigant [20] suggest
that it is hard for regulators to monitor this because of the lack of
transparency in dark pools.18
Another suggested application users cryptographic methods to
provide a trustworthy trading system that supports rule-based trad-
ing, with participants submitting general trading rules rather than
orders to buy and sell [43]. In addition to leveling the playing field
between various parties, with all rules executed on the basis of the
current market price (e.g., from NBBO at each “tick” of the ex-
change), this may allow the exchange or regulators to examine sys-
temic risks or simulate various scenarios on the market.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Market design is unnecessarily encumbered by concerns about
trust. Are published information flows and order processing rules
being faithfully followed? Good actors who want to build well
functioning markets are hampered by problems of adverse selec-
tion. It is difficult to credibly commit to operating a dark pool that
does not leak information, does not provide advantages to some
subset of traders, and does not facilitate trades through affiliated
businesses.
The interim CEO of Luminex has stated that his goal is “to build
trust among users through transparent trading rules and protocols
and efficient execution” (emphasis added) [6]. Yet the straightfor-
ward meaning of transparency is at odds with what institutional
investors find interesting about dark pools. Investors don’t want
anyone to literally be able to see everything that is happening in
the dark pool. Secrecy-preserving proofs of correctness can pro-
vide both trust and transparency. A market operator can prove
that rules are being correctly implemented without revealing infor-
mation about orders that investors would prefer to remain hidden.
With ongoing research and development, strong secrecy can also be
provided, so that the market operator is completely prevented from
revealing pre-trade information about orders.
18Spoofing is the name given to the behavior of artificially placing
a large order outside the bid-ask spread and then canceling it, ex-
pecting that information will leak out to HFTs who will trade and
move the price slightly but on the basis of misleading information.
For example, an investor with a large block of securities may place
a large buy order, driving up the price. The order can be canceled,
with the investor instead selling smaller portions of the security.
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Appendix
A1. Actions by Regulators against Dark Pool
Operators
Pipeline.
In October 2011, the SEC charged the Pipeline dark pool with
violating regulations by misrepresenting the way in which trades
were being executed [35].20 Pipeline stated that it operated a market
that matched customer orders with those from other customers, and
prevented the disclosures of pre-trade information. But according
to the SEC, Pipeline failed to disclose that upwards of 80% of the
shares traded where bought or sold by a wholly owned subsidiary
of Pipeline. This subsidiary had special access to data about trading
activity in order to more accurately predict the side and limit price
of customer orders, and would also place and then cancel large or-
ders to assess interest. It would then buy shares in other markets
and seek to sell in the dark pool, or otherwise sell short and seek to
buy in the dark pool. Without acknowledging guilt, Pipeline agreed
to settle the SEC’s charges and pay a $1 million penalty.
Liquidnet.
In June 2014, the SEC charged Liquidnet, Inc. with violating
ATS regulations by not protecting the confidentiality of pre-trade
data [34]. Liquidnet operates a dark pool for large block trades and
represented to its members that it would keep their trading informa-
tion confidential and allow them to trade with maximum anonymity
and minimum information leakage.21 According to the SEC, the
“Ships Passing alert” tool notified Liquidnet’s trading desk (which
19David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, and
Christopher A. Thorpe. Practical Secrecy-Preserving, Verifiably
Correct and Trustworthy Auctions. U.S. Patent 8,024,274.
Michael O. Rabin and Christopher A. Thorpe, Method and appara-
tus for time-lapse cryptography U.S. Patent 8,526,621.
Christopher A. Thorpe and David C. Parkes. Zero-knowledge
proofs in large trades US Patent application 2009/0177591.
David C. Parkes and Christopher A. Thorpe. Zero-Knowledge
Proofs in Large Trades. October 2008. U.S. Patent Application
2009/0177591.
Michael O. Rabin, Rocco A. Servedio, Christopher Thorpe. Highly
efficient secrecy-preserving proofs of correctness of computation
U.S. Patent Application 2009/0327141
20Pipeline was launched in 2004, using software originally devel-
oped by Fidelity. The system imposed a minimum order size of
10,000, 25,000 or 100,000 shares depending on the stock. When
an order was placed the stock symbol would be displayed to all
members, but without indicating the side, price or size. If two cus-
tomers entered market orders for the same stock on opposite sides
the trade would be executed at the midpoint of the NBBO at the
time of the trade. It changed its name to Aritas in January 2012,
and closed in May 2012.
21The Liquidnet dark pool has electronic access to a member’s or-
der management system and looks for matches among members
interested in buying and selling the same stock. The potential buy-
ers are invited to negotiate with each other, anonymously, through
the Liquidnet system [34]. Once negotiations begin, typically they
are completed within seconds [2] and the vast majority of trades
occur at the NBBO midpoint. Liquidnet controls participation by
monitoring the propensity of participants to complete a trade once
matched.
it operated, in addition to its dark pool) when there were missed ex-
ecution opportunities based on member indications. Another tool,
“Internal InfraRed” provided information on the indicated interest
and number of shares that Liquidnet members were interested in
buying or selling to employees in a business unit. Without acknowl-
edging guilt, Liquidnet agreed to settle the SEC’s charges and pay
a $2 million penalty.
Goldman Sachs SIGMA X.
In June 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), an independent regulator for securities firms in the U.S.,
charged that the Goldman Sachs SIGMA X dark pool executed
nearly 400,000 trades between July 29, 2011, and August 9, 2011 at
a price inferior to the best price on public exchanges [10].22 With-
out acknowledging guilt, Goldman Sachs agreed to settle FINRA’s
charges and pay a $800,000 penalty.
Barclays LX.
In June 2014, the U.S. State of New York charged that Barclays
defrauded and deceived participants in its LX dark pool, at the time
the second-largest dark pool by volume [21].23 According to the
complaint, while Barclays was telling investors it monitored the
dark pool to keep the market free from HFTs minimize the likeli-
hood that HFTs would act as counterparties, Barclays was catering
to HFTs rather than protecting them. Barclays represented that its
“Liquidity Profiling” tool would monitor every trade in the dark
pool and grade traders by how “aggressive” their trading activity
was (“0” aggressive, “5” passive), and allow members to decline
to trade with some grades. But the Attorney General charges that
Barclays (i) did not remove aggressive traders from the market, (ii)
altered the profiles of traders from within Barclays such as Bar-
clays Capital Making to make them a “4” despite being evaluated
as a “0” or a “1”, (iii) did not apply profiling to many orders, and
(iv) provided HFTs with special access to servers to gain a speed
advantage. Barclays contests the suit.
Citigroup LavaFlow.
In July 2014, the SEC charged that Citigroup’s LavaFlow trading
system failed to protect confidential member data, allowing an af-
filiate to gain access to help determine where to route orders [33].24
According to the SEC, LavaFlow also provided non-displayed or-
ders, promising that pre-trade information on these orders would
remain hidden. LavaFlow allowed a subsidiary to use a system
named “ColorBook” to gain access to information about these non-
displayed orders, using the information to decide how to route or-
ders for its own customers. Without acknowledging guilt, Citigroup
agreed to settle the SEC’s charges and pay a $5 million penalty.
UBS dark pool.
22The Goldman Sachs SIGMA X dark pool was launched in 2006
and facilitates block trades. Today it is the sixth largest ATS by
volume [40].
23The Barclays LX dark pool provides two types of interactions.
Members can post a limit order or place a market or pegged order.
LX provides Liquidity Profiling using metrics to determine whether
an order flow is aggressive, based on the movement of price after
trades and the size of trades. Members can specify which grades
are acceptable for a counter-party in a trade.
24Lava Flow was an electronic crossing network (ECN), providing
much of the same functionality as public exchanges, including both
displayed and non-displayed orders. Citigroup closed LavaFlow
system on January 30, 2015. Citigroup continues to operate Citi
Cross, Citi Liquifi and Citi Match.
In January 2015, the SEC charged that UBS created secret order
types in its dark pool to allow HFTs to exploit investors, without
disclosing this to participants [32]. Orders could be placed frac-
tionally above or below other orders, violating regulation designed
to prevent orders from executing before others based on economi-
cally insignificant sub-penny differences. These order types were
marketed almost exclusively to HFTs, according to the SEC. The
SEC also charges that UBS failed to disclose a system to prevent
an order executing against aggressive traders, making this available
only for orders executed by UBS’s own trading algorithms. With-
out acknowledging guilt, UBS agreed to settle the SEC’s charges
and pay a $14.4 million penalty.
A2. U.S. Regulatory Landscape
Securities Exchange Act (1934).
The SEC is charged with facilitating the establishment of a na-
tional market system that promotes five objectives: (1) econom-
ically efficient execution of securities transactions, (2) fair com-
petition among broker-dealers, among exchange markets, and be-
tween exchange markets and non-exchange markets; (3) price
transparency; (4) best execution of investor orders; and (5) an op-
portunity, consistent with economic efficiency and best execution,
for investor orders to meet without the participation of a dealer.
National securities exchanges.
Regulated markets that include Nasdaq, the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), NYSE Arca, BATS Exchange and Nasdaq OMX
BX. Two defining features of a national securities exchange are:
(a) they have to be open to anyone to trade
(b) if orders are displayed to traders (orders need not be dis-
played) then the best prices must be published to the consolidated
quotation stream.
Alternative trading systems (ATS) .
An ATS provides a marketplace for buyers and sellers of securi-
ties, but is regulated differently from a public exchange. An ATS
is private, has members, and can discriminate who comes into the
trading system. In addition, an exemption (see Reg ATS, below)
allows orders to be displayed to members without going to the con-
solidated quotation stream. ATSs include electronic crossing net-
works (ECNs) and dark pools. ECNs offer various order types in-
cluding both displayed and undisplayed order types. Dark pools
generally provide just non-displayed order types.
Regulation NMS (2007).
Reg NMS is a set of rules that applies to trading in any Na-
tional Market System (NMS) stock, which generally means any
exchange-listed security. Reg NMS applies to both public ex-
changes and ATSs. Components of Reg NMS include:
(a) A fair access provision. If trade volume in a stock is greater
than 5%, then a trading system cannot deny access based on poten-
tial trading strategies of an applicant.25
(b) Order protection (or “trade through”) rule. A public exchange
with displayed orders has what are called “protected” orders and
the best bid and ask most be distributed to the consolidated quota-
tion stream.26 All other markets have to respect the best published
prices: no trade can occur on a NMS stock during regular trading
25Liquidnet gained a 20% exemption.
26A public exchange does not need to display orders. For example,
a frequent batch auction with an undisplayed order type would not
need to publish orders.
hours at a price that is outside the best publicly displayed price.27
The main exception to this is provided by an Intermarket Sweep
Order (ISO). Such an order can be executed immediately, without
checking for prices in other public exchanges. In this case, the re-
sponsibility for ensuring order protection is held by the initiator of
the order, who should send a limit order at the current best dis-
played price to all markets simultaneously to ensure compliance.28
Consolidated quotation stream.
Public exchanges must publish best displayed bids and asks to a
consolidated quotation stream. ATSs must also do this for orders
displayed to their subscribes when the volume that is traded in the
stock is above 5% of total volume. This live stream is consolidated
by the Security Information Processor (SIP), currently operated by
the Nasdaq. The SIP is used to define the NBBO at any point in
time. It is with regard to the NBBO that the order protection rule
of reg NMS is defined.
Regulation ATS (2002).
Reg ATS is a set of rules that regulate ATSs, allowing them to
operate under a different legal framework from national securities
exchanges. In particular, an ATS can discriminate who comes into
the system, for example based on trading behavior. An ATS must
still meet the fair access and order protection provisions of Reg
NMS. Components of Reg ATS include:
(a) Display/execute exemption. If the trading volume in a stock
is below 5% of national volume, then there is an exemption from
the requirement to publicly distribute the best bid and ask quote to
the consolidated quotation stream.29 (An ATS that does not display
orders to its own members does not need to distribute best bid and
ask quotes even if its trading volume is greater than 5%.)
(b) an ATS must establish safeguards and procedures to protect
members’ confidential trading information.
Post-trade information.
SEC rules require that post-trade information be reported to a
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) trade reporting
facility once trades have executed, and typically within 30 seconds
of the trade. This information is then disseminated to the market.
FINRA Trade Data Disclosure Requirements (2014).
ATSs are required to report their aggregate weekly volume of
transactions and number of trades by security (in part, this is to
enable regulators to check for trading volume thresholds in regard
to Reg ATS).
Regulation Systems Compliance (2015).
The Reg SCI rules apply to national securities exchanges and
ATSs and generally obligate market operators to implement and
enforce policies and procedures related to capacity, integrity, re-
siliency, availability and security of their systems. In part, Reg SCI
is designed to establish procedures that promote the maintenance of
fair and orderly markets and ensures that they operate in a manner
that complies with the Exchange Act.
27Dark pools such as Liquidnet that set the price based on manual
negotiation using a messaging system have an exemption; in this
case, the price at which trade occurs must be within the NBBO at
some point in the last 20 seconds.
28For example, a dark pool can be compliant with the order pro-
tection rule by sending ISOs to execute against any better-priced,
protected quotations, in all public exchanges at the same time as
matching block orders within the pool.
29Liquidnet has received a 20% exemption.
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